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NOTE, MULTILATERALISM VS.
UNILATERALISM IN THE SOVEREIGN
DEBT RESTRUCTURING CONTEXT: WILL
EITHER APPROACH PREVENT DEFAULT?
Kristin McFetridge *
I. INTRODUCTION
HE invasion of Iraq by the United States in the spring of 2003,
absent a mandate by the United Nations, launched new discourse
over the age-old issue of the efficacy of the multilateral approach
to resolving international issues. Effectively spurning the mechanisms in
place to address international crises, the United States opted instead to
act unilaterally and proceeded to invade Iraq, supported openly by only
the United Kingdom and Spain. This is but one example, albeit the most
salient in today's political climate, of the United States rejecting a unified
multilateral resolution. In the context of sovereign debt, the United
States has acted in concert, withdrawing any support for an international
bankruptcy type scheme in early 2003. Instead, the United States has
urged the use of Collective Action Clauses (CACs) by the financial com-
munity as a preferable alternative, espousing the concept of the freedom
of contract. Yet, the question remains whether this is indeed the optimal
solution for creditors and debtors alike and whether the use of these
clauses will prevent further crises or eradicate current issues in restructur-
ing. Therefore, despite the United States' essential declaration that a
multilateral approach is null, it is still necessary in a thorough analysis of
potential resolutions to examine the now defunct proposal of the Sover-
eign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) by the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) and its strengths and weaknesses as compared to the
current prevailing recommendation of using CACs.
This paper sets out to describe the three most prevalent, and conflict-
ing,recommendations for managing the past, current, and potential sover-
eign restructuring issues and to analyze the viability of each: (1) the
SDRM proffered by the IMF; (2) the incorporation of CACs; and (3) the
complementary use of exit consents in individual debt offerings. The
J.D., M.B.A., Southern Methodist University, 2004. This article was completed in
the Spring of 2004 and does not reflect economic, social, and political events that
have transpired since. Predictions and indicators, while accurate at the time, do
not reflect the current climate in the countries discussed or the sovereign debt
arena generally.
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multilateral versus unilateral framework encompasses this analysis. More
specifically, the focus is whether an internationally unified and standard
method is superior or inferior to an efficient market driven theory,
whereby individuals are free to contract and will, therefore, include cove-
nants and clauses recognizing the potential for default and adjust pricing
and terms accordingly.
Before one can theorize on the ideal solution to a problem, a full un-
derstanding of the scope of the problem is necessary. To that end, part II
of this paper begins with the relevant background information concerning
the events of the last thirty years giving rise to the need for a restructur-
ing solution, including a discussion of the relevant players in the interna-
tional financial community. Parts III and IV, respectively, examine in
depth the SDRM proposal and the use of CACs, including the status of
both the benefits and criticisms of each Finally, the conclusion compares
the two approaches and exposes the shortcomings of each, suggesting that
a combination of both is really the optimal solution.
II. BACKGROUND
A. FINANCIAL MARKETS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
1. Example: The Latin American Debt Crisis
The unique problem of sovereign debt did not occur in a vacuum. Cer-
tain events led to changes in the international financial arena that precipi-
tated the crises of the past thirty years, beginning with the Mexican peso
crisis in the 1980s. In order to fully comprehend the suggested solutions,
it is helpful to place them in the context of the entire situation. This sec-
tion begins with an examination of the changes in the capital markets and
their implications in sovereign indebtedness.
In the late 1970s, commercial banks in the United States were in search
of borrowers, as economic conditions in the United States had curtailed
the need for capital.1 Additionally, strong export prices in Latin Ameri-
can countries and the high inflation rate in the United States indicated
minimal risk for borrowing nations despite high interest rates. 2 These
factors led many U.S. banks to invest heavily in Mexico and other Latin
American countries with perhaps less scrutiny in terms of risk analysis
than would have been pragmatic.3 This heyday came to a crashing halt in
1979. The oil crisis forced debtor nations to increase their borrowing to
compensate for higher fuel prices and the U.S. Federal Reserve Board
raised interest rates.4 This led to a significant exchange rate disparity and
trade imbalance between Mexico and the United States (its largest trad-
ing partner), with Mexico carrying debt equal to 53 percent of its Gross
1. Phillip J. Power, Note, Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the Secondary Market and its
Implications for Future Restructurings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2701, 2707 (1996).
2. Id. at 2707.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 2708.
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Domestic Product (GDP) in 1982.5 The debt burden became unsustain-
able for Mexico and in the same year the country announced its inability
to meet its loan payments.6 Other Latin American nations suffered
under similar conditions, and shortly after Mexico's announcement, Ar-
gentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Venezuela followed suit.7
Through creative refinancing measures, U.S. banks took action to stem
the onslaught of default and the crisis was averted temporarily.8 These
measures consisted primarily of extending "bridge loans" that permitted
the debtor nations to borrow more money to service the interest pay-
ments on their outstanding loans. 9 Bridge loans were attractive to the
banks and the debtor-nations because it allowed them to represent the
outstanding loans as performing loans on their balance sheets. 10 Addi-
tionally, the creditor committees representing the banks in negotiating
restructuring terms used strong pressure to induce all of the lenders in the
class to accept the revised terms.11 The IMF also exerted pressure on the
commercial banks, conditioning the dispersal of funds to assist debtor na-
tions on the cooperation of the banks. 12
Even with this assistance, the Latin American nations found them-
selves unable to stabilize and instead struggled with their growing debt
burdens. 13 The next ten years in Latin America were referred to as the
"Lost Decade" due to stunted economic growth and excessive inflation.14
After several failed proposals, a resolution was suggested by then U.S.
Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Brady.1 5 Brady suggested uniting the
banks that had lent to each particular country by pooling the outstanding
loans and repackaging them as bonds that could then be sold on the sec-
ondary market to individual investors.16 This resolution appealed to the
banks, allowing them to remove the liabilities of the loans from their bal-
ance sheets, and to the debtor-nations because the new bonds included a
reduction in either the principal or the interest rates and were backed by
U.S. Treasury zero coupon bonds.1 7 Once this securitization into the
Brady Bonds occurred, the relationship between the debtor nations and
the banks was effectively terminated, with all future debt payments made
5. Raphael Bergoeing et al., Decades Lost and Found: Mexico and Chile since 1980,
26 FED. RES. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS Q. REV. 1, 4 (2002), available at http://minne-
apolisfed.org/researchlQR/QR2611.pdL
6. Power, supra note 1, at 2708.
7. Id. at 2710.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. At the time, loans were only shown as non-performing if the borrower was in
default on the interest payment, not the principal. Non-performing loans ad-
versely affect the balance sheet of lending banks.
11. Id. at 2711-12.
12. Power, supra note 1, at 2712.
13. Id. at 2714.
14. Bergoeing et al., supra note 5, at 1.
15. Power, supra note 1, at 2720.
16. Id. at 2721.
17. Id.
20051
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to a trustee who forwarded the coupon payments to the bondholders.18
Thus began a new trend in raising capital for indebted nations.
By 1994, the amount of eligible debt converted into Brady Bonds was
in excess of $190 billion, with $61 billion total forgiven.19 All of the
Brady Bonds were issued with a choice of law clause selecting New York
law,20 and two implications: first, the agreements were subject to the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act,21 and second, amendments to the pay-
ment terms (including amount and schedule) often required a unanimous
vote by all bondholders.22 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act holds
that generally, sovereigns are immune from suit in a U.S. court.2 3 How-
ever, exceptions to this general rule include waiver or engagement by the
foreign sovereign in a commercial activity.24 Both of these exceptions
were applicable in this case and bondholders did (and do) have legal re-
course within the United States in the event of a default by a debtor na-
tion.25 The options for these debtor-nations to restructure were severely
constrained, as bonds issued under New York law tended to require una-
nimity to effect changes to the payment terms of the bond agreements. 26
B. THE USE OF BONDS IN RAISING EQUITY
Following the use of Brady Bonds in the Latin American crisis of the
1980s, more and more debtor-nations turned to bond issuances as an al-
ternative to higher interest bank loans. The conversion of Brady Bonds
also became a popular option with Mexico initiating a $2.5 billion dollar
swap in 1996.27 In this new issuance, the bonds were absent one noticea-
ble item-collateral. 28 These new dollar-denominated bonds were issued
at a thirty-year maturity, and the proceeds were used to pay off short-
18. Id. at 2720.
19. William Cline, Managing International Debt: How One Big Battle was Won, THE
ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 1995, at 17.
20. Rory MacMillan, The Next Sovereign Debt Crisis, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 305, 353
(1995).
21. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441, 1602 et seq. (2003).
22. The use of unanimity clauses in the United States has historical roots, tracing back
to the Stock Market Crash of 1929. After the crash, shareholders of companies
would buy bonds from their companies and then vote to forgive to debt, freeing up
capital for the shareholders. In response to this, the U.S. government passed the
Trust Indenture Act of 1939 with the provision that bond payments could only be
restructured by a unanimous vote or in an official bankruptcy proceeding. While
this Act does not apply to sovereign debt agreements, it establishes a drafting pre-
cedence that is followed in practice. See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Exit
Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges, 48 UCLA L. REV. 59, 66-67 (2000) [here-
inafter Exit Consents].
23. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441, 1602.
24. Id.
25. See MacMillan, supra note 20, at 353.
26. The majority of bond agreements governed by New York Law adopt the unanimity
as a matter of standard drafting convention. For a complete discussion of the
background and reasons for this, see Buchheit & Gulati, Exit Consents, supra note
22.
27. Mexican Debt: Warranted, THE ECONOMIST, May 4, 1996, at 75.
28. Id.
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term debt that was coming due. 29 Argentina quickly leapt on the band-
wagon by issuing three and fifteen-year Deutschemark-denominated
bonds.30 In September 2002, Mexico issued a twenty-year, $1.75 billion
bond and used the proceeds to buy back $1.3 billion worth of Brady
Bonds.3'
One commonality between the Brady Bonds and other non-collateral-
ized bonds is that, unlike bank syndicated loans, which are contractually
held by large easily identifiable financial institutions, these bonds are
highly mobile, issued in a number of different jurisdictions, and sold to a
plethora of different investors. 32 These characteristics present a unique
problem for debtors wishing to revise the terms of the bond agree-
ments-locating the bondholders to achieve their consent is difficult and
depending on the structure and jurisdiction of the bond agreements,
agreement by the majority or unanimity may be required. 33 Additionally,
unlike in large syndicated loans, creditors in bond packages do not know
the identity of each other and have no relationship or incentive to col-
laborate in the event of a restructuring. 34 As one scholar described it,
[b]ond investors are like patrons in a theater audience: each one has
decided to see a particular play on a particular night, but none has
any idea who she will be seeing it with. If you wish to carry the
analogy further, the tradable nature of bonds means that fellow pa-
trons are constantly leaving and entering the theater throughout the
performance. 35
This is a good illustration of the anonymous nature of the relationship
between bondholders. In the situation of a performing debtor, the rela-
tionship is irrelevant. In the case of a need to restructure, a myriad of
problems can erupt, primarily that of the "hold-out creditor" who refuses
to restructure, jockeying instead for a preferential settlement. 36
29. Id.
30. Id. at 76.
31. Id. at 75.
32. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, THE DESIGN OF THE SOVEREIGN DEBT RE-
STRUCTURING MECHANISM-FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS 5, n.3 (Nov. 27, 2002),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2002/112702.pdf [hereinafter
IMF SDRM Proposal].
33. According to the IMF, roughly 25% of international and Brady Bonds are issued
under English law that permits a majority vote to approve changes to the payment
terms. The remaining bonds are issued under New York law, generally requiring
unanimity for amendments to payment terms. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND, RESOLVING AND PREVENTING FINANCIAL CRISES: THE ROLE OF THE PRI-
VATE SECTOR (Mar. 26, 2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/
2001/032601.htm [hereinafter RESOLVING AND PREVENTING FINANCIAL CRISES].
34. Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51
EMORY L.J. 1317, 1320 (2002).
35. Id.
36. Samuel E. Goldman, Comment, Mavericks in the Market: The Emerging Problem
of Hold-Outs in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 5 UCLA J. INT'L. L. & FOREIGN
At. 159, 164 (2000).
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C. LIFE AFTER BRADY BONDS-RECENT EVENTS IN LATIN AMERICA
Following the Brady Bond bailout, the Latin American region wit-
nessed a period of comparative stability. However, for some countries,
the foreign currency-denominated bonds were a ticking time bomb wait-
ing to explode. The market for emerging economy debt at its height in
1998 with $88 billion being raised, began to wane shortly thereafter in
1998-99 as a result of Asian and Russian economic troubles.37 As the
U.S. economy started to turn south at the end of the millennium, ex-
change rates were profoundly affected, as was the trade in countries with
significant financial ties to the United States. 38 Brazil suffered a currency
devaluation in 1999 and Argentina's dollar-pegged currency that caused
their exchange rate to be overvalued, stifled exports and stimulated im-
ports.39 Some argue the devaluation of the Brazilian Real also adversely
affected Argentina, a primary trading partner in Mercosur, 40 as the Ar-
gentine dollar-pegged peso remained strong in comparison.41
Argentina's trade imbalance led to a dearth of foreign capital greatly
needed to make payments on the outstanding foreign currency denomi-
nated bonds.42 With $30 billion due in 2002, and total debt equal to 50
percent of the GDP as of 2001,43 Argentina halted all payments on its
$141 billion debt in the spring of 2003.44 This default resulted in a lengthy
and painful process, with payments still in arrears and Argentina facing
over $750 million in lawsuits, the most recent of which is the first certified
class action suit against a sovereign in a U.S. court.45 Negotiations be-
tween the bondholders and Argentina are still underway, but the progno-
sis is not positive. Peter Allen, the financial advisor to the Argentina
Bondholders' Committee, commented that "[u]nfortunately, there is re-
ally very little good faith between the government and the foreign bond
holders at the moment .... ",46 Further complicating the restructuring is
37. A Better Way to go Bust, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 1, 2003.
38. Id.39. Martin Feldstein, Argentina's Fall: Lessons from the Latest Financial Crisis, 81
FOREIGN AFF. 8 (2002).
40. MERCOSUR, or Mercado Comin del Sur, is a free trade and common market
agreement between the following countries: Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Ar-
gentina, with Chile and Bolivia as associate members. The treaty, or Tratado de
Asunci6n, was signed in March of 1991, and has the unique aspect of focusing on
cultural alignment as well as economic growth, representing the fourth largest eco-
nomic coalition in the world, with 80% of Latin American companies located
within the MERCOSUR nations. The agreement has stimulated trade between
members, with growth exceeding 300% in the years between 1991 and 1999. See
Jerry Haar, Bring Back Competitiveness, LATINFIN, Mar. 2002, at 39. For more
information see http://www.mercosur.org.uy.
41. Editorial, Don't Cry for Argentina, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2001, at A18.
42. Feldstein, supra note 39, at 8.
43. Id.
44. John Barham, Heading out of the Storm, LATINFIN, Feb. 2003, at 16.
45. US Ruling a Setback for Argentina, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2004, at B4.
46. Paivi Munter, Argentina Faces a Restructuring Challenge: After a Dollars 95bn De-
fault, Settlement With its Creditors Will Take Years, FIN. TIMES LTD., Mar. 5, 2003,
at 35.
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the complexity of Argentina's debt, which includes over 100 bonds de-
nominated in dollars, yen, euros, pounds sterling, and Swiss francs,
largely owned by European retail investors.47
D. FURTHER EXAMPLES OF BOND USAGE
Latin American countries are not the only nations who have turned to
sovereign bonds to raise capital and then faced surmounting debt
problems. The Ukraine, Pakistan, Ecuador, Russia, and Peru also uti-
lized these financing vehicles, later dealing with the reality of disparate
creditors and unmanageable payment schedules.48
Following years of struggle after the demise of the Soviet Union in
1993, Russia issued five dollar denominated bonds as domestic debt.49
Again in 1996, in an attempt to raise equity, Russia issued short-term
treasury bonds, and in the two years subsequent, issued several
Eurobonds.50 In 1997, when the oil market suffered a drop in prices, rep-
resenting 25 percent of Russia's exports at the time, Russia's credibility
was diminished and fears of currency devaluation led the IMF to offer an
$11.2 billion bailout. 51 Unfortunately, this aid failed to stave off a Rus-
sian default.52
Similarly, the Ukraine, Pakistan, and Ecuador all utilized foreign cur-
rency denominated bonds as a means of raising capital and subsequently
were forced to restructure their debts. 53 Fortunately, Pakistan and the
Ukraine were able to swap their bonds for new issuances with more
favorable payment terms, without facing litigation from any of their
bondholders. 54 Ecuador was also able to reach a workout with its credi-
tors when the country announced in 2000 that it would have to restruc-
ture $ 6.65 billion in bonds. 55 The deal involved an offer to swap thirty-
and twelve-year bonds-98 percent of the Ecuadorian bondholders ac-
cepted the offer.56 While these countries have all been able to facilitate
ad-hoc restructurings, the number and frequency of nations increasingly
encountering financial difficulties provided an incentive for the interna-
tional financial community to devise a standardized, predictable manner
of dealing with potential defaults.
47. Id.
48. RESOLVING AND PREVENTING FINANCIAL CRISES, supra note 33.
49. FREDERICO STURZENEGGER, DEFAULT EPISODES IN THE 90s: FACTBOOK AND
PRELIMINARY LESSONS 22 (June 2002), available at http://www.utdt.edu/-fsturzen/
pinto2.pdf.
50. Id. at 24.
51. Id.
52. Christopher J. Mailander, Financial Innovation, Domestic Regulation and the Inter-
national Marketplace: Lessons on Meeting Globalization's Challenge Drawn from
the International Bond Market, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON 341, 388 (1997-
98).
53. See generally STURZENEGGER, supra note 49.
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E. SUMMARY OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE
Analyzing the existing international financial framework under which
these debt instruments were issued is crucial to fully comprehending the
implications of any resolution to the issue of sovereign debt. The interna-
tional financial architecture has been the subject of countless debates, ar-
ticles, studies, and research, and is generally thought to be comprised of a
variety of international financial institutions with varying initiatives,
membership, and degrees of authority.
Following the Mexican peso crisis, seven representatives of the major
industrial nations convened to address the issues in Lyon, France, in
1996.57 At this summit, the Group of Seven (G-7) 58 requested that the
major international financial institutions develop standards for the inter-
national financial community, as well as viable solutions to avert similar
crises in the future.59 Following that meeting, in 1998, the finance minis-
ters and Central Bank Governors of twenty-two nations set up working
groups to investigate certain aspects of international finance, including
crisis management.60 Out of this effort came a report endorsed by the G-
7 which requested that the IMF, the World Bank, the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision, and other international bodies work together to
develop international standards. 61
The IMF became heavily involved in the structuring of the interna-
tional financial architecture, in concert with the World Bank and the Ba-
sel Committee on Banking Supervision. 62 In addition to exploring an
international set of standards and rules governing the global economy,
the IMF sought out to examine a possible resolution to the financial cri-
ses of its member nations.63 The result of that examination is the
SDRM.64
F. THE ROLE OF THE IMF
Through its nature of involvement in financial crises, the IMF has been
at the heart of the sovereign debt discussion. The IMF is a supranational
57. Joseph J. Norton, A "New Financial Architecture"--Reflections on the Possible
Law-Based Dimension, 33 INT'L LAW. 891, 899 (1999).
58. The G-7, now known as the G-8, is a supranational organization that meets annu-
ally with leaders from each of its member nations to address key economic, politi-
cal and social issues in the international arena. The G-8 representatives are
leaders from the following nations: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia,
the United Kingdom, the United States and a member of the European Union.
For more information, see http://www.g8.gc.ca/menu-en.asp.
59. Norton, supra note 57, at 901.
60. Herbert V. Morais, The Quest for International Standards: Global Governance vs.
Sovereignty, 50 KAN. L. REV. 779, 789 (2002).
61. Id. at 790.
62. Horst Kohler, Managing Director, Int'l Monetary Fund, Remarks at the Central
Bank Governors' Symposium: Reform of the International Financial Architecture:





organization, founded in 1944 at the Bretton Woods conference. 65 Since
its inception, it has grown from forty-five member countries to 184 mem-
bers.66 The IMF's Articles of Agreement explain that the purpose of the
IMF is "to promote the stability of exchange rates, the financing of bal-
ance of payment deficits, and the liberalization of payments for current
international transactions. ' 67 The IMF does not see itself as a lender or
as a financial institution that serves to assist debt-ridden nations. 68 The
funds received by qualifying nations are delivered through currency ex-
change transactions, whereby the IMF purchases a nation's currency with
an alternate currency in order to facilitate a restoration of the balance of
payments. 69 However, as of September 2004, the IMF had approximately
$97 billion in loans and credits outstanding to eighty-four countries. 70
The IMF has a long history of involvement with financial crises, from
the Mexican Peso Crisis of the 1980s, to the East Asian Crisis in 1997.7 1
The IMF has been the source of much controversy, not the least of which
focuses on the IMF's role in perpetuating globalization. Not everyone
favors the liberalization of capital markets and globalization like the fi-
nancial world does. In fact, opponents of globalization compare it to the
colonialism and imperialism of times gone by, actually damaging the
human rights of inhabitants of the historically known lesser developed
countries (LDCs). 72 Specifically, it is argued that the repayment of debt
to the IMF and the World Bank prohibits spending for domestic health-
care and education.73
Further criticism of the IMF centers on its perceived expansion of its
original role in the international financial community. As one scholar
notes,
[i]t is far from evident that the IFIs74 are operating in accordance
65. International Monetary Fund, The IMF at a Glance (Sept., 2004), http://www.imf.
org/externallnp/exr/facts/glance.htm.
66. Id.
67. Francois Gianviti, Evolving Role and Challenges for the International Monetary
Fund, 35 INT'L. LAw. 1371, 1371 (2001); see also Articles of Agreement of the
International Monetary Fund, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa
(last visited March 12, 2003).
68. Gianviti, supra note 67, at 1389-90.
69. Id. at 1390.
70. The IMF at a Glance, supra note 65.
71. Id.
72. Antony Anghie, Time Present and 7me Past: Globalization, International Finan-
cial Institutions, and the Third World, 32 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 243, 252-53
(2000).
73. For example, in Tanzania in 2000, debt repayment was six times that of the health-
care budget, while in Ethiopia it is four times the public spending on healthcare.
And in the continent of Africa as a whole, nations spend four times more on debt
repayments than they do on education or healthcare. See id. at 253. For a through
discussion of the IMF's initiatives in this area, see International Monetary Fund,
Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, http://
www.imf.org/externallnp/exr/facts/hipc.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2003) [hereinafter
HIPC].
74. The use of IFIs refers to International Financial Institutions, in this instance, the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
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with these provisions. Commentators have pointed out that, in re-
cent times, the IFIs are playing an extraordinarily intrusive role in
establishing national economic policy. They have expanded their
mandate to deal with an enormous range of issues which seem far
removed from the core functions they are required to perform by
their Articles of Agreement. Furthermore, contrary to their Articles
of Agreement, the decision-making of both these institutions appears
to be based on the interests of the majority shareholders rather than
on the technocratic considerations contemplated by the Articles of
Agreement. 75
In addition to an alleged abuse of powers, the IMF has been criticized
for making assumptions about economies that have led to these financial
crises. Specifically, in encouraging globalization, the IMF anticipated
that these markets "had already achieved what foreign aid is allegedly
allocated to help them become: capitalist economies able to receive
money and allocate it according to market principles, free from patronage
and accountable creditor expectations. ' '76 Despite the controversy sur-
rounding the IMF, efforts continue to work with the troubled economies
of debtor nations. However, this criticism has cast a shadow on any reso-
lutions that the IMF posits, especially the SDRM.
III. THE MULTILATERAL APPROACH:
THE IMF'S PROPOSAL OF A SDRM
A. BACKGROUND
At the request of the International Monetary and Financial Committee
(IMFC), an advisory committee on the international monetary and finan-
cial system to the IMF,77 Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director
of the IMF, first introduced the proposal for the SDRM in November
2001.78 Subsequently, the IMF explored varying approaches with the in-
ternational financial community and promulgated an official draft on No-
vember 27, 2002.79 On January 22, 2003, the IMF held a conference to
discuss the SDRM proposal and to elicit feedback from the international
community. 80 Shortly thereafter, the United States indicated its unwill-
ingness to support the proposal, despite strong support by the United
Kingdom and other members of the European Union. Due to the United
75. Anghie, supra note 72, at 266.
76. James Soemijantoro Wilson, Why Foreign Aid Fails: Lessons from Indonesia's Eco-
nomic Collapse, 33 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 145, 170 (2001).
77. International Monetary Fund, A Guide to Committees, Groups, and Clubs, http://
www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/groups.htm#IC (last visited Mar. 22, 2003).
78. Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director, Int'l Monetary Fund, Presenta-
tion at the European Commission, Brussels, Belgium: Sovereign Debt Restructur-
ing Mechanism-One Year Later (Dec. 10, 2002), http://imf.org/external/np/
speeches/2002/121002.htm.
79. IMF SDRM Proposal, supra note 32.
80. International Monetary Fund, A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring:
an IMF Proposal (Jan. 22, 2003), http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ecforums/
2003/012203.htm.
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States' lack of support, the SDRM was essentially shelved in lieu of the
CAC approach. 8 1 While it is no longer being actively pursued, the lessons
learned should still be utilized in the sovereign debt context, and the IMF
and the United States have urged the international community to do just
that.
It bears mentioning that the SDRM was not applicable to countries
with extremely low income and excessive debt. Under the Heavily In-
debted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, the IMF endeavors to provide a
form of debt forgiveness for those nations with unsustainable levels of
debt, dangerous levels of poverty, and poor social and economic health.
82
Countries included in the HIPC initiative tend to be in Africa and have to
qualify for assistance under this program following a negative debt sus-
tainability analysis. 83 Under this debt analysis, if a country's external
debt ratio exceeded 150 percent of the net present value of its debt to
exports, the country was considered for eligibility and was then required
to adhere to various IMF/World Bank economic and financial programs
in order to receive the initiative's full benefits. 84
B. THE SDRM IN BRIEF
The IMF designed the SDRM under the guidelines of eleven principles:
1. the SDRM should only be used for debts that are unsustainable
and should not be used in such a way as to encourage default;
2. the SDRM should include incentives for nations to quickly effec-
tuate a restructuring;
3. conflicts with contractual obligations should be kept to a mini-
mum and should be limited to measures that serve the best inter-
ests of the collective creditors;
4. the SDRM should promote transparency in the manner of
restructuring;
5. early and active creditor involvement should be encouraged;
6. there should be no interference with the sovereignty of a debtor
state to that end, activation can only be made at the sovereign's
request;
7. the SDRM should only provide mechanisms to incent negotia-
tion, and should not be a concrete plan for the restructuring
process;
8. flexibility and simplicity are essential in order to provide endur-
ance of the structure over time;
9. the SDRM should not supersede domestic insolvency structures
already in place and applicable to any claims;
10. dispute resolution should be facilitated in an effective, impar-
tial, and expedient manner; and
81. Alan Beattie, US Set to Block 'Sovereign Chapter 11' Proposals, FIN. TIMES LTD.,
Mar. 31, 2003, at 13.
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11. the IMF's role in the SDRM should be limited to its existing
powers and must not be enlarged in any way. 85
C. CLAIMS UNDER THE SDRM
Claims that fell under the SDRM included "all rights to receive pay-
ments relating to the commercial activities of the sovereign." 86 A claim
could be included in the restructuring when there was a clear contractual
obligation to provide payment in either currency or goods in association
with commercial activities. 87 "The central government would have the
option to include its own debt and, subject to the consent of the debtor in
question, claims on: (i) the central bank and (ii) public entities or subna-
tional governments that are not subject to a domestic insolvency frame-
work."88 There are often occasions where a central government has
guaranteed funds for a third party or holds another contingent obligation,
and these claims would not have automatically fallen under the bailiwick
of the SDRM.89 However, had the claims underlying any sovereign guar-
antees entered into default or had the contingent claims either matured
or could easily be valued at market conditions, these claims would also
have been included in the debt restructuring. 90
Claims excluded from the framework included domestic debts gov-
erned by the applicable insolvency laws of the debtor nation and debts
owed to international organizations, including the IMF.91 Although
claims by international organizations and domestic lenders would not
have fallen under the auspices of the SDRM, the handling of these claims
would have been provided in the name of transparency. 92
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the SDRM was the exclusion
of international organizations from the class of creditors to be restruc-
tured. The proposal clearly defended this position, stating that
multilateral development banks provide both adjustment lending
and financing for investment in human and physical capital at lower
costs than could be obtained from international capital markets. The
financing of such public goods and capital formation promotes both
financial stability and economic growth, and thereby enhances the
value of private creditors' claims. The ability of these institutions to
provide financing at the current cost structure depends critically on
the assurance that their claims would not be captured in a sovereign
debt restructuring. 93
The proposal also stated that restructuring of these outstanding debts
85. IMF SDRM Proposal, supra note 32. at 7-9.
86. Id. at 17.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 8.
89. Id. at 20.
90. Id.
91. IMF SDRM Proposal, supra note 32. at 9.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 22-23.
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would not be expected. 94 Interestingly, claims of the Paris Group 95 or
other official bilateral groups would have been restructured either within
the SDRM as a separate class or in tandem with the SDRM. 96 The
SDRM proposal went on to explain creditor classification, placing all un-
secured claims in the same class and allowing secured claims and official
bilateral creditors to be in separate classes. 97
D. ACTIVATION
The proposal also left open the question of whether a sovereign could
unilaterally initiate the mechanism or whether independent validation
would have been required, and if so, by whom. 98 Once activated, the
SDRM outlined a process whereby creditors were notified of all out-
standing claims, including those that would have been structured in tan-
dem, but not under the SDRM, and those that would not have been
restructured at all.99 Once notified, all creditors were required to register
their claims within a certain time period or their claims were declared
null and void. 100 After notification to all of the creditors, a creditor's
committee would have been created with representation from the credi-
tors, and approval of any measures would have required a vote of 75 per-
cent of the outstanding principal claims. 10' This vote also empowered the
creditors to reject the usage of the SDRM, as an option existed for the
creditors collectively to vote to terminate the mechanism once the pro-
cess was activated. 0 2
E. STAY OF CLAIMS
Once activated, no stay of claims existed, as in the U.S. bankruptcy
laws. Rather, any monies collected through litigation would be sub-
94. Id.
95. The Paris Club is a group of informal creditors who work to find solutions to un-
sustainable debts by debtor-nations, beginning in 1956 with a meeting between
Argentina and its creditors at the time. A completely informal arrangement, the
Club has managed to work through 366 arrangements with over seventy-five coun-
tries, with a total debt of $410 billion, since its inception. The unique aspect of the
Paris Club is that it has no legal basis, status, or authority in the international
arena, yet the creditor nations have agreed upon a set of guidelines to be followed.
Meetings are held several times a year, always in Paris, and the group is committed
to finding ways to restructuring debt, including rescheduling or reducing debt obli-
gations. The creditor member countries are: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, the Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. Other official creditors who have been invited to attend
meetings, but are not members are: Abu Dhabi, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil,
Korea, Israel, Kuwait, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Portugal, Trinidad and To-
bago, and Turkey. For more information, see http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/.
96. IMF SDRM Proposal, supra note 32, at 23-24.
97. Id. at 49-51.
98. Id. at 9.
99. Id. at 29.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 10.
102. IMF SDRM Proposal, supra note 32, at 26.
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tracted from any amount apportioned to that creditor through the re-
structuring agreement. 10 3 This exclusion of the traditional insolvency
concept was justified on the basis that it interfered with the contractual
rights of parties who were already at a disadvantage in terms of bargain-
ing power with the sovereign borrowers. 04 Following notification, credi-
tors with secured claims would have the option of seizing any collateral to
the extent afforded by their contractual rights. 10 5 Unsecured creditors
could have initiated any action within their rights; however, judgments
awarded but not received would also be subject to the SDRM as an addi-
tional liability and could thus be altered by a majority vote of the credi-
tors. 10 6 In an effort to further discourage hold-out creditors and
litigation, judgments that were received would be subject to the "hotch-
pot" rule.10 7 The hotchpot rule, derived from English bankruptcy law,
effectively reduces any subsequent settlement by the amount received in
litigation, thereby ensuring equitable distribution of payments.10 8 A
drawback to this approach arose where the creditor was able to receive a
larger judgment than that which would have been apportioned under the
SDRM. While there was no method to rectify this potential inequity, the
IMF believed that the lengthy process of litigation and remuneration
would have far exceeded the time required to effectuate the SDRM,
thereby eliminating any potential value to the hold-out creditor. 10 9
Rather, the creditor ended up receiving the amount to which he was enti-
tled under the SDRM, but with the added loss of his legal expenses.
Another insolvency concept excluded from the SDRM involved inter-
est payments. In some jurisdictions, interest payments cease to accrue
upon commencement of restructuring. °10 The SDRM did not recom-
mend this action, but instead allowed any additional debt accumulated as
interest to be included in the restructuring."1 Additionally, any new fi-
nancing was not given priority over existing claims as is a common prac-
tice.1 12 Rather, if a qualified majority of the creditors approved, any new
financing could be excluded from the restructuring.11 3
103. Id. at 9.
104. Id. at 33.
105. Id. at 38.
106. Id. at 34.
107. Id. at 36.
108. IMF SDRM Proposal, supra note 32, at 37. For example, if Creditor A is owed $10
million dollars and receives a judgment for $5 million, that award will reduce any
amount apportioned to Creditor A under the SDRM. Hence, Creditor A's claim
is still valued at $10 million and not the reduced $5 million, so a percentage of
recovery is based on the original amount. If, under the SDRM, Creditor A is
entitled to 75% of the debt, Creditor A will receive $7.5 million, minus the $5
million already received, rather than 75% of the remaining $5 million. Creditor A
will receive $2.5 million from the restructuring, not $3.75 million.
109. Id. at 38.
110. But compare with the U.S. Chapter 11 procedure, which does not halt the accrual
of interest. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994).
111. IMF SDRM Proposal, supra note 32, at 42.
112. Id. at 47.
113. Id.
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F. ADMINISTRATION
Overseeing all of these procedures was the Sovereign Debt Dispute
Resolution Forum (SDDRF), consisting of twelve to sixteen appointees
with judicial experience in debt restructuring matters.1 4 These individu-
als would operate from their home nations and would comprise a pool
from which judges were impaneled in the event of a crisis. 1 15 For each
incident, four judges were to be appointed-one to oversee the process
and three to serve as an appellate forum.1 16
The legal basis for this process involved amending the IMF's Articles,
which requires a three-fifths approval by the members holding 85 percent
of the voting power.1 1 7 Because this amendment implicates international
treaty terms, many nations, including the United States, would require
legislative endorsement and possible revision of certain domestic laws
and policies. 1 8 Following that, a verification process would be needed
where creditors and claims would be finalized, with any disputes being
managed by the SDDRF.1 19
G. BENEFITS
The most obvious benefit of the SDRM was the potential simplification
and standardization of having an international mechanism. Removing
the uncertainty would have helped to reassure creditors and debtors
alike. As the current situation stood then, and continues now, any poten-
tial default is handled on an ad-hoc basis, often with the IMF stepping in
with significant bailout packages (as in the case of Argentina).120
The availability of a structured approach would also have likely en-
couraged more open communication between debtor-nations and credi-
tors, possibly eliminating the need for costly and painful defaults, such as
the one Argentina had recently experienced. When comparing Argen-
tina's experience with Brazil's, it is clear that voluntary submission to re-
organization bodes far better for a quick economic recovery.1 2 '
H. CRITICISMS
The SDRM was subject to significant criticism from the international
financial community and IMF member nations. But in the spring of 2003,
the announcement was made to discontinue any efforts to establish the
114. Id. at 11.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. IMF SDRM Proposal, supra note 32 at 12.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 33.
120. Alan Beattie, Argentine "Blackmail": As the IMF Prepares a $6bn Debt Roll-over,
Doubts about the Fund's Credibility Resurface, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2003, at 11.
121. William Rhodes, The Drawbacks of Orderly Rescue by a Formal Bankruptcy Pro-
cedure for Countries Facing Economic Crisis would be Inefficient and Damaging,
FIN. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2002, at 13.
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multilateral approach espoused in the mechanism.
122
A very vocal criticism of the SDRM focused on the impartiality, or
rather, lack thereof, of the IMF in instituting a solution. As one scholar,
Christopher Paulus, has pointed out in referring to the IMF and World
Bank and their ability to oversee an international insolvency proceeding,
"these institutions are too allied with the creditors (even if this were true
only from the debtor's perspective) because they themselves are in fact
also creditors. ' 12 3 This was a commonly held concern, exacerbated by
the SDRM's exclusion of IMF claims in any restructuring. As William
Rhodes, the senior Vice-Chairman of Citigroup, Citicorp, and Citibank,
stated,
[w]hile private sector creditors frequently take losses in country
workouts-40 percent with Ecuador recently, on top of an earlier 45
percent under the Brady Plan-the international financial institu-
tions, including the IMF and Paris Club of government lenders re-
duce their claims only for the so-called highly indebted poor
countries. 12
4
Mr. Rhodes also felt that the institutionalizing of a formal bankruptcy
standard would have
encourage[d] more restructurings, thereby further damaging emerg-
ing markets as a group and threatening contagion. One result would
be reduced private capital flows and a greater need for public sector
finance. At the same time, countries that are successfully meeting
their debt obligations but face temporary liquidity problems might
come under domestic political pressure to file for bankruptcy protec-
tion, worsening market sentiment and delaying a return to growth. 125
He was not alone in his sentiments. Although the SDRM has been
criticized as being too pro-creditor, many bankers and investors were also
displeased with the efforts of the IMF. 126 Their concern prior to the issu-
ance of the SDRM appeared to be that the proposal would permit sover-
eigns to halt payments through a stay on creditor claims. 12 7 Voicing those
concerns was Sir David Walker, a senior advisor at Morgan Stanley, who
stated that "'[i]f the market thinks a mechanism will be put in place
where a sovereign borrower in trouble can pull the trigger and stop pay-
ing its debts, it will react by tightening up those debt contracts before it
122. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOVEREIGN
DEBT-AsSESSING THE BENEFITS, RISKS, AND FEASIBILITY OF AGGREGATING
CLAIMS 4 (Sept. 3, 2003), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/
2003/090303.pdf [hereinafter IMF RESTRUCTURING SOVEREIGN DEBT].
123. Christopher G. Paulus, Some Thoughts on an Insolvency Procedure for Countries,
50 AM. J. CoMP. L. 531, 541 (2002).
124. Rhodes, supra note 121.
125. Id.
126. Alan Beattie & Peronet Despeignes, IMF Fights for New Sovereign Debt Rules,




Clearly, the IMF listened to these concerns, as evidenced by the exclu-
sion of the stay on creditor enforcement and priority financing. 129 This
was met with a backlash from others in the international financial world
who argued that a stay on enforcement is imperative, as is the need for
priority treatment for any new debt issued subsequent to commencement
of an insolvency procedure.' 30
Finally, some parties felt that the need for a complete overhaul of the
international financial crises management system was unnecessary and
unrealistic. Experts at the International Institute for Economics claim
that most sovereign debtors pay their debts in a timely fashion and the
challenges posed by instituting the SDRM far exceeded any benefit that
would be derived. 131 The process for instituting this measure, including
amending the IMF's Articles of Agreement and for a large part of the
membership to adopt domestic legislation in support of it, was considered
by some to be insurmountable. 132 This was especially true given that a
significant factor behind the financial crises of the past was weak domes-
tic bankruptcy laws. 133
The nail in the coffin of the SDRM was the very public withdrawal of
support by the United States. In a statement to the IMFC in April 2003,
U.S. Treasury Secretary John Snow publicly rejected the use of the
SDRM stating that "[t]he source of these problems lies in the relation-
ships and agreements of debtors and their creditors. It is these parties,
not an international organization that must assume responsibility for the
solution. Therefore, it is neither necessary nor feasible to continue work-
ing on [the] SDRM."'1 34
In the same speech, Secretary Snow also called for the inclusion of
CACs as an alternative and preferable approach to the sovereign debt
restructuring issue, challenging the IMF to focus on encouraging the
widespread use of CACs, as well as improving transparency and open dis-
closure. 135 Following the dismissal of the SDRM by the United States,
the focus did indeed turn towards the inclusion of CACs in new bond
128. Id. It bears noting that with or without a sovereign debt mechanism, countries
have chosen to cease payments on their debt, including Argentina, Ecuador, and
Russia. See Rhodes, supra note 121.
129. Christopher G. Paulus, supra note 123, at 547.
130. Id.
131. Business Week Online, The IMF Mess: Can the Treasury Dept. Push the Sort of
Real Reforms That Will Help Deadbeat Nations and Their Creditors Come to
Terms? (Sept. 20, 2002), http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/sep2002/
nf20020920_3801.htm.
132. Barry Eichengreen, Bailing in the Private Sector: Burden Sharing in the Interna-
tional Financial Crisis Management, 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD. AFF. 57 (1999).
133. Sean Hagan, Insolvency Reform and Economic Policy, 17 CONN. J. INT'L L. 63, 69
(2001). For a through discussion of the Indonesian bankruptcy system, see E.
Bruce Leonard, Bankruptcy-Indonesian Style, 21 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26 (2002).
134. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Statement by Treasury Secretary John Snow
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agreements and the viability of their usage in correcting existing agree-
ments drafted under conventional unanimity terms.
136
IV. THE UNILATERAL APPROACH:
COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES
A. BACKGROUND AND MECHANICS OF CACs
Since the abandonment of the SDRM, the international financial com-
munity has concentrated their efforts in the area of debt restructuring on
the usage of CACs as a means to eradicate default. Long used in English
bond contracts, CACs allow a majority of creditors to amend clauses, in-
cluding those regarding payment terms of existing agreements, provided
a minimum number of creditors approve the changes. 137 The Group of
Ten (G-10) 138 issued a working report on September 26, 2002, regarding
the use of contractual clauses to remedy sovereign debt problems and
proffering recommended terms to be included in bond agreements.'
39
Among the clauses recommended by the G-10 for inclusion in sovereign
debt agreements were CACs, termed "majority amendment clauses," that
would permit a majority of bondholders to amend their payment terms;
or alternatively, a majority clause to approve an exchange for a new of-
fering.140 In both cases, determining the threshold for participation
would be measured by either a percentage of the outstanding principal
amount or based on a quorum system, whereby a quorum of bondholders
must be reached before the requisite percentage approval vote would be-
come effective. 141 With regard to changes in payment terms, the G-10
recommended the maximum level be 75 percent, while lowering that level
to 66.66 percent for terms not related to payment. 42
In addition to payment clauses, the G-10 set out detailed recommenda-
tions for altering other terms of bond agreements, including the election
of a bondholder representative, who is similar to a trustee and would
serve as the liaison for bondholders in communications with the
debtor. 143 This bondholder representative would negotiate restructuring
terms with the debtor and would have power to take legal action and
136. Id.
137. Jack Boorman, Special Advisor to the Managing Director, Int'l Monetary Fund,
Speech given at conferece cosponsored by the CATO Institute and The Economist:
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism: Where Stands the Debate? (Oct. 17,
2002), http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2002/101702.htm.
138. The G-10 Working Group on Contractual Clauses is comprised of representatives
of the central banks from the European Union and the following countries:
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland,
Sweden, the United States, and the United Kingdom. GROUP OF TEN, Report of
the G-10 Working Group on Contractual Clauses (Sept. 26, 2002), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/gten09.htm.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 3.
141. Id. at 5.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2.
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distribute any recovery to the bondholders.144 The need for improved
disclosure and transparency also calls for additional financial covenants,
requiring the debtor to provide timely and specific information regarding
financial and economic status.1 45 In an effort to limit disruptive accelera-
tion of claims and litigation, clauses would be added to provide for a ma-
jority vote to approve a stay of claims. 146
The examples proffered by the G-10 were soundly endorsed by the
United States. 147 John B. Taylor, U.S. Secretary of Treasury for Interna-
tional Affairs, outlined the American proposal in a speech to the Institute
for International Economics in April 2002, calling for a majority vote
binding on all bondholders, agreeing to a restructuring, a bondholder rep-
resentative, and an activation process by which the sovereign could enter
into restructuring negotiations while staying any litigation or claims as
necessary.1 48
Following the United States' lead, the IMF also shifted gears and issued
multiple working papers and reports on the progress and surrounding is-
sues of the use of CACs. 149 Since the United States' dismissal of the
SDRM, the IMF has explored the use of CACs in depth by examining
whether an aggregation of claims could be incorporated into the ap-
proach so that creditors across the board could be considered during any
vote to restructure, mimicking the all-encompassing bankruptcy style fo-
rum.150 While ultimately deciding that aggregation should not be pur-
sued, the analysis did reveal areas in need of improvement and continued
exploration.1 51 Additionally, the IMF has published information regard-
ing the status and prevalence of CAC usage in the sovereign bond
context. 5
2
144. GROUP OF TEN, supra note 138, at 2.
145. Id. at 3.
146. Id.
147. John B. Taylor, Under Secretary of Treasury for International Affairs, Speech at
the Conference Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards: Sovereign Debt
Restructuring: A US Perspective (Apr. 2, 2002), http://www.iie.com/publications/
papers/taylorO042.htm.
148. Id.
149. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, PROGRESS REPORT TO THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY AND FINANCIAL COMMITTEE ON CRISIS RESOLUTION (Sept. 5, 2003),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/cr/2003/eng/O90503.pdf [hereinafter
IMF PROGRESS REPORT]; INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, COLLECT-VE Ac-
TION CLAUSES: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES (Mar. 25, 2003), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/psi/2003/032503.pdf [hereinafter IMF COLLECTIVE
ACTION CLAUSES]; INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, REVIEWING THE PROCESS
FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING WITHIN THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAME-
WORK (Aug. 1, 2003), available at http://www.imf.orglexternal/np/pdr/sdrm/2003/
080103.pdf [hereinafter IMF REVIEWING THE PROCESS]; IMF RESTRUCTURING
SOVEREIGN DEBT, supra note 122.
150. IMF RESTRUCTURING SOVEREIGN DEBT, supra note 122.
151. Id. at 29.
152. Id. at 24.
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B. COMPLEMENTARY USE OF EXIT CONSENTS
IN CURRENT BOND AGREEMENTS
While the use of CACs is a viable option to prevent default in new
bond contracts, the issue still remains that there are billions of dollars in
bonds already in existence, which are governed by agreements missing
these provisions and structured in such a way that payment terms cannot
be altered at all. 153 As a complementary solution, debtors may have the
option of swapping existing agreements for new ones that do include
CACs and using the exit consents in the old offerings to provide protec-
tion from bondholders who refuse to submit to the swap. 154
Should a debtor choose to offer a new bond to its existing creditors,
any of the bondholders have the option to accept or refuse the new con-
tracts. The danger lies with the creditors who refuse the new agreements
because once these hold -outs are established, they will comprise the ma-
jority of the bondholders. 155 Depending on the terms of the agreement,
the hold-outs could even accelerate payment in the event of a default.156
To combat this problem, debtors can utilize clauses in bond agreements
that allow for nonpayment-related alterations to the bond. 157 Typically,
these clauses require a one-half or two-thirds vote of the bondholders,
but do permit changes to the agreement.1 58 The intent is that by using
these clauses in exchange for new debt instruments, bondholders will
amend the agreement, rendering it invaluable to any potential hold-out
creditors. 159 The old bond agreements can then be swapped for new
agreements with revised payment terms that effectively restructure the
debt. 160 Examples of the types of clauses that can be removed through
this manner are financial covenant clauses that reduce the secondary
market value of the bond and other clauses that impair the likelihood of
repayment, hamper debt acceleration efforts, or limit the rights to pursue
litigation in the event of a default.16'
The use of exit consents to affect a swap of old agreements to new is
illustrated by the recent restructurings of Uruguay and Ecuador. Follow-
ing the Argentine crisis, Uruguay was faced with a debt totaling over $11
billion and restructured close to half of that in 2003.162 Ecuador was the
first nation to use exit consents to impair old bonds in lieu of the new
153. Buchheit & Gulati, Exit Consents, supra note 22, at 59.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. Most bond agreements include language that permits acceleration of unma-
tured principal in the event of a default. A default is also not necessarily a failure
to pay on that particular instrument; it can also be the failure to adhere to certain
financial covenants related to solvency, liquidity etc. or a default on another loan
or bond.
157. Id. at 60.
158. Id.
159. Buchheit & Gulati, Exit Consents, supra note 22, at 60.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. IMF REVIEWING THE PROCESS, supra note 149, at 32.
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issues. 163 In Uruguay's case, the old agreements were modified to affect
the waiver of sovereign immunity, and bondholders were given the option
to opt out of the exit.164 For those who did agree to the exchange, they
approved consents that limited the hold-out creditors from enforcing the
debt obligation part of the bond.165
C. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CAC USAGE
The IMF has undertaken several reports to measure the usage of
CACs, since the focus of the international financial community shifted
from the SDRM. Mexico has been lauded as leading the way with a $1
billion offering in February 2003, governed by New York law and includ-
ing a 75 percent majority action clause. 166 In keeping with the G-10 rec-
ommendations, Mexico measured the bond threshold in terms of
outstanding principal and excluded from the voting any bondholders
who are directly or indirectly controlled by the government, but rejected
the use of activation and transparency clauses and chose to rely instead
on market drivers to establish best practices. 167 The IMF reported this
offering as successful, as there was no evidence of a yield premium in
either the initial offering or secondary market. 168 However, whether this
is more likely a reflection of Mexico's investment grade is still an open
question. Whether a lower grade sovereign would enjoy the same result
remains to be seen. In terms of creditor action following a default, the
Mexican bond did include a threshold of 25 percent outstanding principal
minimum vote before acceleration of payments could begin and more
than 50 percent outstanding principal vote to de-accelerate payments. 169
With the absence of a clause representing a bondholder representative,
the agreement was silent as to the result of any bondholder litigation. 170
Following the Mexican offering, several other sovereign nations issued
bonds governed by New York law that included CACs. In the offerings
by Brazil, South Africa, the Republic of Korea, Belize, and Guatemala,
the IMF found no showing of a pricing disadvantage attributable to the
use of CACs. 171 The threshold for restructuring was set at 75 percent for
163. Id.
164. Id. at 24.
165. Id. at 33.
166. INTERGOVERNMENTAL GROUP OF TWENTY-FoUR, G-24 SECRETARIAT BRIEFING
PAPER ON SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING (Apr. 4, 2003), http://www.g24.org/
debt.pdf. The Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four consists of representa-
tives from developing nations to convene over matters of international monetary
and fiscal policy. The member countries are: Algeria, Cote D'Ivoire, Egypt, Ethio-
pia, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa, Democratic Republic of Congo, Argen-
tina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela,
India, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Syrian Arab Republic.
See Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four, About the G-24, http://www.g24.
org/about.htm.
167. IMF COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES, supra note 149, at 20-21.
168. Id. at 22.
169. Id. at 24.
170. Id. at 32.
171. IMF PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 149, at 3.
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the Korean and South African issuances, while the Brazilian, Guatema-
lan, and Belizean bonds increased the percentage to 85 percent. 172 All of
the bonds included a 25 percent acceleration clause, and the Korean and
South African bonds followed suit with Mexico by including a 50 percent
de-acceleration threshold, while the remaining three countries opted for
66.66 percent. 173
In total, the number of bonds issued with CACs has increased. In Feb-
ruary 2003, the IMF reported that 33 percent of bonds issued included
CACs. 174 The European Union Finance Ministers have also stated that
any bonds issued for European Union members that are governed by for-
eign law or subject to a foreign choice of forum clause will include
CACs. 175 Despite the small percentage of these issuances, this statement
heralds strong public support for the use of CACs. In terms of actual
numbers of bonds issued in the first three quarters of 2003 in the emerg-
ing markets sector, of the forty nine issuances, twenty-seven included
CACs, nine of which were governed by New York law. 176 Contrast this
with the numbers reported in 2001 (ninety-three issuances and less than
two were issued under New York law) with CACs, and it is clear that the
United States' push for CACs is having an impact on market practices.177
D. BENEFITS
The primary benefit of using CACs and exit consents, and the reason
the United States is so firmly in support of such tools, resides in the abil-
ity of individual debtors and creditors to fashion their own mutually ac-
ceptable terms and covenants. This freedom of contract is a fundamental
principle in U.S. law and is evidenced in the market driven policies of the
American financial community. In fact, even U.S. securities regulation is
premised on disclosure rather than merit, facilitating independent deci-
sion-making on the parts of investors. 178
A second, but no less prevalent, advantage of CACs and exit consents
is the relative ease with which this change can take place. Rather than
requiring multilateral treaty amendments and subsequent domestic legis-
lation overhauls, parties can begin, and indeed have begun, implementing
these changes immediately.
Finally, the fact remains that the United States and the international
financial community have pledged their support for the use of CACs in
lieu of a SDRM type structure. Regardless of whether CACs are the
ideal solution, or whether debtor nations would prefer an international
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forum for resolution, as the parties who hold the purse strings, the United
States and other creditors will ultimately dictate the path chosen.
E. CRITICISMS
Obviously, while the merits of utilizing CACs and exit consents is that,
in tandem, the two could prove immediately effective (i.e., using the exit
clause to entice creditors to accept new agreements containing CACs),
the problem still remains that the creditors must be willing to accept the
terms of the new agreements. They must believe that what is in the best
interest of the debtor is in their best interest as well. This common eco-
nomic predicament is referred to as the Prisoner's Dilemma where one
party must trust that their sacrifice is truly the most advantageous for all.
In terms of hold-out creditors, this poses a daunting challenge. For exit
consents to help reduce the number of hold-out creditors, there must first
be a significant number of creditors willing to approve the use of the
bond altering exit consents. The IMF reports that persuading these credi-
tors to accept the new arrangement may be more likely when a default is
already imminent, defeating the purpose of including CACs and exit con-
sents to avert default.179 Contributing to this concept is the ever-present
concern of moral hazard and the historical bail-out packages provided by
the IMF. As evidenced by recent restructuring attempts, creditors are
much more likely to hold-out if the option of an IMF bail out package
seems imminent.
Locating and assembling a significant enough number of creditors to
utilize this option also remains a formidable task. As described above,
bondholders are numerous and varied, and a mechanism would have to
be instituted to capture data on the individuals or institutions empowered
to vote on any collective action. This mechanism could be accomplished
with the G-10's recommendation of appointing a bondholder representa-
tive. But, as evidenced by the Mexican offering, this clause may not be
included.180 The IMF has also recommended a method for tracking
bondholders through a voluntary registry system.1 81 Notwithstanding the
fact that there is no forum to maintain this type of information, even if
this were feasible, it would only affect new issuances. Locating and as-
sembling data on current bondholders would be a significant and costly
challenge. 182
But what if exit consents are not an option? The use of CACs alone
will do nothing to eliminate the current burden on nations, as it can only
be applied to agreements issued here forthwith.1 83 It still stands that the
majority of current bond contracts cannot be amended to include this
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type of provision. 184 Additionally, Jack Boorman, Special Advisor to the
Managing Director of the IMF, criticizes the use of CACs because the
application of the law among the varying jurisdictions would be inconsis-
tent by virtue of the fact that each jurisdiction maintains their own legal
idiosyncrasies. 185 This issue is most troubling for debtor nations who
could face disparate legal treatment among jurisdictions, possibly from
the same bond indenture where legal action may be initiated by a multi-
tude of bondholders. Although choice of law and forum clauses are inev-
itably included in each agreement, it is not atypical for sovereign debtors
to hold multiple bonds denominated in various currencies and governed
by different nations.
Market concerns about the signaling effects of the use of CACs also
cannot be discounted, despite the comments by the IMF regarding the
Mexican issuance. 186 Noted economist Barry Eichengreen outlined this
concern in an article published in advance of his book on the Interna-
tional Financial Architecture. 187 Eichengreen pointed out that any na-
tion choosing to include these types of clauses in their debt instruments
may be the victim of the adverse signaling effect, whereby choosing to use
these clauses indicates the likelihood of default and the need for
rescheduling.1 88 He analogizes the use of these clauses to the use of a
prenuptial agreement by a bride and groom.1 89 Until and unless the in-
clusion of these clauses becomes standard drafting technique, using such
clauses may be counterproductive.
The implication of U.S. securities laws is also a factor that must be
recognized. In bonds issued by Egypt, Lebanon, and Qatar in 2000 and
2001, the exemption under Rule 144A was perfected, allowing the issuers
to sell only to qualified institutional buyers, thus avoiding the complex
and tedious registration process. 190 But it is still undetermined whether
any discussions between creditors and debtors regarding a swap or new
issuance would violate securities regulations preventing market condi-
tioning. This communication between potential investors and the issuer
or underwriter could be construed as an offer to sell, and, absent a statu-
tory prospectus, would be a violation of section 5(c) of the 1933 Securities
Act. 191 Indeed, Ecuador and Uruguay both determined that the details
of their respective debt exchanges could not be disclosed until the proper
filings were made with the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission. 92
Finally, the inclusion of CACs in each bond agreement fails to address
the restructuring in its entirety, unless a type of aggregation is included in
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the agreement. So, while a single bond may be revised, absent a clause to
the contrary, each individual debt agreement would have to be modified
independently through a costly and complex process. The IMF drafted a
report on the use of aggregation in the CAC context, and while finding
merit in the efficacy, ultimately determined that the challenges and po-
tential negative reaction of the market indicated that it "would not be
appropriate for the Fund to endorse a particular set of aggregation provi-
sions at this time.' ' 193 Uruguay did include a form of aggregation in their
recent debt swap in that payment terms could be modified for multiple
bonds via an aggregate voting mechanism. 194 Specifically, the 75 percent
threshold would drop to 66.66 percent on each individual bond, upon a
vote to restructure by 85 percent of the bondholders of the aggregated
outstanding principal amount. 195 But this aggregation was limited, as it
only applied to new bonds issued under the same trust agreement and
governed by New York law. 196 Any past issuance or other forms of sov-
ereign debt would not be eligible for aggregation.1 97 The G-10 also
touched on the potential for aggregation among creditors for voting pur-
poses and came to the same conclusion as the IMF, stating that "while
desirable, is not practicable within a contractually based mechanism."1 98
V. CONCLUSION
A. COMPARISON OF METHODS
It is not enough to merely analyze the differing proposals for sovereign
debt in and of themselves, absent the underpinning motivation of the res-
olution. Different nations and cultures strive for varied goals in the reso-
lution of solvency issues. For example, the United States tends to
encompass a more debtor-friendly approach, encouraging the debtor to
reorganize and asking the creditor to be more accommodating.1 99 In con-
trast, Germany tends to emphasize creditor rights, and France focuses on
the labor force affected by the financial distress.2° ° While these generali-
ties apply to corporate bankruptcy, in cases of nations where total liqui-
dation or external management is not an option, some or all of these may
still be applicable. 20 1
So, while economic efficiency is certainly not a component in evaluat-
ing a solution, whether a plan for reorganization is designed more to pro-
tect the rights of the creditors or to encourage a fresh start for the debtor
is an important factor. The use of the SDRM, exit consents, and CACs all
tend to favor the creditor, an irony that cannot be overlooked given these
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proposals have come from supranational organizations that tend to serve
as creditors. Ideally, given the context of sovereign debt, a plan for reor-
ganization would mimic the more debtor friendly policies of the Unites
States.
Leading economists, politicians, and legal authorities have grappled
with the issue of sovereign debt for years and have failed to come up with
a solution that pleases all parties. The recommendations today are no
exception. Notwithstanding the current status of the multilateral ap-
proach, it is arguable that for purposes of consistency, credibility, and
simplicity, the best solution is still to institute an international sovereign
debt restructuring mechanism. But the SDRM falls well short of an ideal
proposal. The criticisms of the SDRM are valid, but rather than com-
pletely disengaging from the multilateral perspective, the international fi-
nancial community should use the lessons learned from that exercise to
create a more equitable and balanced scheme.
The apparent creditor-friendly framework of the SDRM leaves the
debtors smarting, while the creditors feel as though this mechanism pos-
sesses the power to alienate them from property which they are rightfully
due. Neither party wants to admit that the option of default exists-the
creditors because they feel that will entice debtors into a restructuring
and the debtors because of the potential impact on capital flows to their
home states. But default does exist and the SDRM is a good foundation
for an overarching scheme to handle it. Yet in its currently crippled and
weakened state, the SDRM fails. The exclusion of a stay on creditor
claims and actions, the accumulation of the interest, and the enlarged
power of the IMF all expose the limits of consensus philosophy in multi-
lateral solutions. It succeeds in the aggregation of claims and the consis-
tency and applicability of an international structure and forum. The use
of CACs alone will never accomplish that same uniformity and clarity.
Structurally speaking, the use of CACs essentially provides the same
majority approval process that the SDRM proposed, but manages the res-
olution on a micro-contractual level, retaining any choice of law/forum
agreements included in the individual bond contract.20 2 In contrast, the
SDRM incorporated a more macroeconomic structure, subjugating all
agreements to an overarching international insolvency scheme.20 3 A bal-
ance between the two is the ideal solution-although the United States
definitely favors freedom of contract, contract terms and conditions do
not exist in a vacuum. Rather, there is an entire code, the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, as well as a surfeit of case law, dedicated to eliminating
ambiguity and inconsistency in contract law application. Debtors and
creditors should still have the freedom to negotiate terms acceptable to
both, but there should be an international forum to which nations can
turn in the event of a breakdown. As the past decade has taught us, de-
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203. Id.
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fault is inevitable and pretending that it will not occur is not only harmful
to all parties, but foolish and naYve.
Social contract theory tells us that communities make laws to eliminate
uncertainty. In a truly global economy where nations enter into financial
agreements with each other, all states are essentially a member of the
same community. Adopting a non-regulatory laissez faire style ignores
the reality that default and restructuring is an inevitable result and, ab-
sent a regulatory structure, leads to the type of stand-off we are seeing in
Argentina today.
Critics of the SDRM, or a similar program, point to the challenges in
implementation as support for abandoning the approach. While the lo-
gistics of implementing the SDRM appear unfathomable-requiring not
only an amendment to the Articles of Agreement, but also for each mem-
ber nation to adopt a legal structure that fits in with the regulatory con-
cepts of the SDRM-the fact that a task is daunting is a poor excuse for
failing to try.
Is the IMF really the correct proponent of this type of mechanism? As
a controversial international institution, the IMF appears to be struggling
with an identity crisis regarding its role in the financial community. It
touts itself as being an agency to correct balance of payments problems,
yet admits that most see it as a lender of last resort. It even goes so far as
to exclude itself from debt restructuring because of its position as a credi-
tor who will provide capital when all others refuse. If that action does not
define it as a lender of last resort, then the concept behind its decision is
clearly misunderstood. While the IMF appeared to be limiting its power
on the surface by making outright declarations that the SDRM did not
enlarge its power, it is truly incredible to see how the SDRM did quite the
opposite. Not only did it safeguard the IMF loans from restructuring, but
it put in place a quasi-judicial body to oversee the restructurings that
would be hand selected by the IMF. Additionally, with the IMF's historic
policy of requiring indebted nations to institute social and economic poli-
cies as dictated by the IMF, there can be no question of the lack of impar-
tiality or neutrality in its position with regards to these debtor nations.
While the concept of an international bankruptcy scheme is a good one
in theory and by all rights an obviously necessary one given the status of
the multilateral approach, the likelihood of getting stubborn, fiercely in-
dependent nations and parties to succumb to a supranational power ap-
pears dismal at best. One only need look at the current state of affairs in
the United Nations, the trade squabbles in the World Trade Organization,
or the impaired jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court to realize
that.
Nobel Prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz said it best when he
stated that
it is good news that the IMF, after the failure if six bail-outs in as
many years, finally recognized that an alternative approach was
needed, and that some sovereign debt restructuring mechanism was
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desirable. They are right, too, that one cannot rely on market-based
approaches (a fact which they failed to recognize in East Asia), that
some version of a statutory approach was desirable. It should have
been obvious that in any bankruptcy procedure which is viewed as
fair, a major creditor (such as the IMF) cannot simultaneously play
the role as the bankruptcy judge, nor even have a central role in the
process, other than as one of the claimants. To many, the IMF's at-
tempt to give itself such a central role says much about its political
insensitivities .204
Yet, CACs do not present a viable alternative. As Professor Sitglitz has
pointed out, it is evident that market efficiency based approaches are also
not satisfactory and that
the long debate about bankruptcy reform in the United States should
have made it clear that there is not a single "best" bankruptcy code.
The fact that every government among the advanced industrial coun-
tries has taken a statutory approach (rather than relying on market
mechanisms, modified by, for instance, mandatory collective action
clauses) should have made it clear that the position of the U.S. Trea-
sury (which seemed to claim that all that was required was collective
action clauses) makes little sense, reinforcing the results of theoreti-
cal and empirical research on bankruptcy and bargaining.20 5
In line with Professor Stiglitz's thinking, the CAC/exit consent ap-
proach suffers from its own weaknesses by relying on market actions to
rectify an already tenuous situation. An impromptu, ad-hoc solution at
best, it can be analogized to the little Dutch boy and the dike. No matter
how often you plug the hole, water will seep from somewhere. Rather
than focusing on the leaks, the best bet for international financial com-
munity is to create a consistent and all-encompassing resolution and at-
tack the problem from a new angle. Using loopholes in existing
agreements does nothing to further strengthen investor confidence, na-
tional stability, or fiscal soundness. These three components for sover-
eign solvency should be the focus of the many hours and energies spent in
dissecting the problems with sovereign debt; creating an international fo-
rum for conflict resolution promotes these three concepts. It is far better
to treat the illness than the symptom.
B. FINAL THOUGHTS
In conclusion, the best solution to alleviate the pressure of default is a
combination approach of using unilateralism and multilateralism; or, in
other words, maintaining the freedom to contract, but shrouded in the
safety of an international bankruptcy scheme to encompass externalities.
While the SDRM is an admirable effort and mimics in many ways the





successful bankruptcy practices of developed nations, several aspects
render it lame. Primarily, without the credibility and authority of a su-
pranational body, neutral and empowered to ensure its enforcement, it
remains as idealistic, and yet as ineffective as the intergovernmental insti-
tutions in place today. Additionally, an international endorsement will
not be forthcoming without the United States altering its position on the
preferred solution to debt restructuring. The dogged determination of
the United States to unilaterally claim that CACs are the panacea for all
the ails of the current financial crises stultifies any multilateral efforts.
Even if the weaknesses of the SDRM were addressed and the process
fortified with more debtor-friendly and equitable elements, such as prior-
ity for debtor financing, stays on claims and interest, and a more neutral
adjudicating body than the IMF, without the United States' support, any
efforts appear to be moot.
Having said that, using CACs will not alone eradicate the current eco-
nomic situation, for there are too many unresolved issues, such as an ab-
sence of aggregation, challenges inherent in the volume of outstanding
issuances without CACs, difficulty in locating and assembling the diverse
investors, and concerns regarding U.S. securities law implications. Inevi-
tably, the international financial community will realize this problem
when the next Argentine-style default occurs, and discourse will erupt
again over the optimal solution. It can only be hoped that at this point,
the lessons from the SDRM will be better utilized, and a consensus will
be reached establishing a regulatory framework that is economically effi-
cient, equitable, and effective.
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